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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for her account. Although an undercurator had been appointed
for the interdict and was still acting as such, at the instance
of the plaintiff, the trial court appointed an attorney at law
to represent the interdict. The attorneys so appointed filed
exceptions of no right and no cause of action, of prescription,
and also filed an answer denying the plaintiff's allegations and
calling for strict proof thereof. After a trial, the trial court
dismissed the action, holding that the undercurator was the
proper representative of the interdict, and not an attorney ap-
pointed by the court. The intermediate appellate court affirmed.
The case was governed by the rules of the Code of Practice;
but the same result would have obtained under the new pro-
cedural Code.99
There is some language in the appellate court's opinion, how-
ever, that requires qualification. The trial judge's Reasons for
Judgment, quoted in part with approval in the appellate opinion,
states that "'the articles of the Civil Code and Code of Prac-
tice ... make it plain that the undercurator is the person who
is to represent the interdict in suits wherein the interdict and
curator have conflicting interests.'"
This is too broad a statement of the rule. Both before"00
and under the new procedural Code' 0 an attorney at law must
be appointed to represent an interdict in a partition proceeding,
when he and his curator have conflicting interests.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection
In State v. Clark' a colored defendant, who had been con-
victed of aggravated rape by an all white jury, urged racial
discrimination as a principal basis for his appeal. Systematic
exclusion was not established by the facts that there were only
three Negro names on the petit jury list of 30, and that only 15
99. See LA. COVE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts.'4202, 4553 (1960).
100. LA. CML CoDE art. 1368 (1870), repealed by La. Acts 1962, No. 70.
101. LA. CoDz OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4643 (1960), added by La. Acts 1962,
No. 92, § 6.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 242 La. 914, 140 So. 2d 1 (1962).
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Negroes were included in the tales jury list of 100. It is in-
evitable that, by reason of economic conditions, illiteracy, and
other factors, the number of Negro names on the various jury
venires and lists will not fully conform with a mathematical
ratio of colored to white persons in the area.2
The Clark case is of particular interest by reason of its hold-
ing that racial discrimination was not established by the fact
that the district attorney had peremptorily challenged some of
the Negro jurors. The Supreme Court of Louisiana stressed the
fact that the district attorney had also exercised peremptory
challenges on white jurors. However, it is quite significant that
peremptory challenges are a matter of grace and may be exer-
cised without cause assigned. Also, a colored defendant does not
have a right to have a member of his race on the jury that tries
him.8 It is sufficient that there has not been a systematic ex-
clusion, or token inclusion of members of his race on the jury
venires from which the grand jury and petit jury were drawn.
SUFFICIENCY OF LONG-FORM INDICTMENTS
Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets
forth the necessary contents of the so-called "long-form" indict-
ment, states that "it is immaterial whether the language of the
statute creating the offense, or words unequivocally conveying
the meaning of the statute, be used." In conformity with this
provision, State v. Collins4 upheld a long-form aggravated rape
indictment which charged that the defendant "assaulted and
violently ravished" the victim "against her will and lawful con-
sent." This charge, according to the court clearly informed the
defendant that he was charged with aggravated rape under
Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 42 of the Criminal Code. It would
have been a safer practice, as was done in State v. Clark,5 to
use the authorized short form, "A.B. committed aggravated
rape on C.D.," and then to add additional details providing a
more particularized statement of the nature of the offense
charged.6
2. See cases discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 6 LA. L. REv. 660-62 (1946).
Cf. State v. Goree, 242 La. 886, 139 So. 2d 531 (1962) where systematic exclu-
sion and racial discrimination were found.
3. State v. Anderson, 206 La. 986, 20 So. 2d 288 (1944).
4. 242 La. 704, 733, 138 So. 2d 546, 557 (1962).
5. 242 La. 914, 916, 140 So. 2d 1, 2 (1962).
6. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950).
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THEFT CHARGES - DUPLICITY
The last paragraph of the theft article7 expressly authorizes
the aggregating of separate takings to determine the grade of
the offense. Where separate takings are aggregated, each taking
must, pursuant to Article 225 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure,8 be stated in a separate count. In State v. Norris9 five
separate acts of obtaining gasoline and services by fraudulent
use of an oil company credit card were charged in a single in-
dictment, but without setting forth the acts in separate counts
or numbered paragraphs. In upholding the trial court's refusal
to quash the indictment for duplicity, the Supreme Court stressed
the fact that each act of taking was separately stated and dated,
and concluded: "True, such distinct acts were not numbered and
described in separate paragraphs. However, L.R.S. 15:219,
which defines 'counts' does not state that a count must be set
forth in any particular manner. It merely provides: 'counts
are charges of crime joined in the same indictment'.. . . Hence,
since the instant indictment lists separately the distinct acts
and the amount of each, a forceful argument might well be made
that it contains five different counts in compliance with L.R.S.
15:225."10 The majority opinion admitted that the indictment
might consist of a single count, "inasmuch as the alleged distinct
acts are not listed in separately numbered paragraphs" ;11 and
there is a strong indication that the majority opinion is based
upon the harmless error concept, i.e., that the defendant had not
been injured by the cumulation of the charges in a single count. 12
In this regard the dissenting opinion appropriately points out
that the lack of separate counts prevented the jury from con-
sidering each count separately, and prevented the defendant
from separately pleading to each count. While duplicity may
be waived if the objection is not timely urged, 13 the statutory
right to require a separate statement of each of the cumulated
takings should not be written off as insubstantial.
BILL OF PARTICULARS IN FELONY-MURDER
Article 222 of the 1928 Louisiana Code of Criminal Proce-
7. Id. 14:67.
8. Id. 15:225.
9. 242 La. 1070, 141 So. 2d 368 (1962)..
10. Id. at 1075, 141 So. 2d at 370.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 1077, 141 So.2d at 371.
13. LA. R.S. 15:221 (1950).
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dure provides for the conjunctive charging of a crime which
may be committed in a number of different ways, all of which
are listed in the criminal statute. When the different forms of
a crime are charged conjunctively, proof of either form will
support a conviction. 14 The authorization of conjunctive allega-
tions has been applied to the bill of particulars as well as to
the indictment. 15 Here also, as in framing the indictment, the
district attorney may be unavoidably uncertain as to which form
of the crime will be established at the trial.
In State v. Rogers,16 a murder prosecution, the defense
sought information by a bill of particulars as to whether the
murder charge was being prosecuted as an intentional homicide
under Clause (1) of the murder article, 17 or as felony-murder
under Clause (2). Applying the conjunctive allegation rule, the
Supreme Court held that it was sufficient for the state to an-
swer that the defendant was charged under both Clause (1) and
Clause (2). In short, "murder," according to the court, "can
be committed under Subsection (1) or under Subsection (2)
of the article or under both subsections at the same time, which
is exactly what is alleged to have happened in the instant case."' 8
In answer to a supplemental bill of particulars to determine
which of six possible felonies listed in Clause (2) the defendant
was committing when he killed the victim, the district attorney's
answer that the defendant was committing armed robbery,
simple robbery, and aggravated rape was held to provide de-
fense counsel "ample information to prepare their defense."'19
TIME FOR FILING MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
The bill of particulars, authorized by Articles 235 and 288
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is an important device that
implements the defendant's constitutional right to "be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him" ;20 and
14. State v. Bryan, 175 La. 422, 143 So. 362 (1932) where the Supreme
Court held that, although Article 222 provided that the offense must be charged
conjunctively, it did not require proof of both. When a statute condemns an act
under one or more alternative conditions, all of the alleged alternative conditions
need not be proved.
15. State v. Prince, 216 La. 989, 45 So. 2d 366 (1950), where aggravated
rape had been charged in a short form indictment. Accord, State v. Jackson, 227
.La. 642, 80 So. 2d 105 (1955).
16: 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961).
17. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950).
18. 241 La. 841, 869, 132 So. 2d 819, 829 (1961).
19. Ibid.
20. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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to that end the rules governing the bill of particulars, especially
where the short-form indictment is employed, have been liberally
construed. Ordinarily, a motion for a bill of particulars is filed
prior to arraignment, 21 but the court may allow the motion after
the arraignment. In State v. Barnes22 defendant had been
charged with theft under a short-form indictment. After ar-
raignment and five days prior to trial defense counsel filed a
motion for a bill of particulars. In holding that it was reversible
error for the trial judge to deny the motion "for the sole reason"
that it was filed "too late," the Supreme Court stated: "Conse-
quently whenever the short form indictment is used in a prose-
cution, the accused is entitled, upon timely request, to be fur-
nished with a bill of particulars setting out such matters that
are of the essence of the charge against him and not included
in the indictment and any other facts that are necessary for
him to properly and intelligently prepare his defense. '23 (Em-
phases added.)
Several questions remain partially unanswered as to the full
implications of Barnes. Foremost is the query when the motion
for a bill of particulars is not "timely," for the motion in Barnes
had been filed after one continuance had been granted and just
five days before the case was set for trial. An additional query
arises whether the trial court's overruling of the motion for a
bill of particulars was held to constitute reversible error because
of the fact that a short-form indictment had been employed,
or because of the summary manner in which the trial judge
overruled the motion with the brief statement that it was filed
"too late."
In any event, Barnes provides considerable clarification of
the Supreme Court's thinking concerning the time for filing a
motion for a bill of particulars. First, the bill of particulars is
an important device for implementing the defendant's constitu-
tional right to be apprised of the nature of the charge against
him, and it is of particular importance when the short-form
indictment is employed. Second, motions filed after the arraign-
ment are not necessarily untimely and should ordinarily be con-
sidered by the trial judge. Third if the court refuses to consider
a belated bill of particulars, as in Barnes, it must clearly and
21. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950).
22. 242 La. 102, 134 So. 2d 890 (1961) 22 LA. L. REV 676 (1962).
23. Id. at 893, 134 So. 2d at 892.
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fully state the circumstances showing that the bill amounted to
a dilatory tactic, as distinguished from a bona fide effort to
procure needed information.
PLEA BARGAINS
So-called "plea bargains," entered into by mutual agreement
of defense counsel, the district attorney, and the court, serve a
very useful purpose. They help keep the criminal docket current
by encouraging guilty defendants to plead guilty upon the assur-
ance of a fair and reasonable sentence. The conclusive nature
of sentences imposed pursuant to such agreements has been
recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court.24 State v. Hingle25
affirmed the enforceability of a plea bargain under which the
defendant had pleaded guilty of attempted possession of mari-
juana cigarettes. In addition to a minimal sentence of two-
and-one-half years, the district attorney had agreed, with ap-
parent consent and approval of the court, not to invoke an
increased sentence against the defendant as a multiple offender.
The Justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court were in general
agreement that such a plea bargain, entered into with knowledge
and consent of the court, was binding upon the state and pre-
cluded the defendant from subsequently being charged as a
fourth offender, found guilty, and sentenced as such. An im-
portant point of difference between Chief Justice Fournet's
majority opinion and Justice Sander's concurring opinion re-
lated to the question whether the assent and apparent approval
of the court was necessary to render the district attorney's
agreement not to charge the defendant as a multiple offender
enforceable.
The majority opinion's holding, that the district attorney
had inherent authority to enter into binding plea bargains with-
out the advice or consent of the court, was largely posited upon
the general statement of the powers of the district attorney in
Articles 17 and 18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and upon
the district attorney's specific authority, under Article 329, to
determine when a nolle prosequi shall be entered. 2 After stress-
ing the broad authority vested in the district attorney by these
articles of the Code, Chief Justice Fournet concluded:
24. State v. Mockosher, 205 La. 434, 17 So. 2d 575 (1944).
25. 242 La. 844, 139 So.2d 205 (1962).
26. LA. R.S. 15:17, 15:18, 15:329 (1950).
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"[W] hen, in a bargain made by a district attorney, an ac-
cused is promised immunity, the courts should give effect
to such agreement, for it would not be consonant with the
pledge of the state's public faith reposed in these officers by
the legislative branch of our government to permit them to
repudiate bargains made with persons accused of crimes
who are acting in good faith, and, in reliance thereon, comply
with their commitments by relinquishing valuable and funda-
mental rights. '27
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sanders stressed the differ-
ence between the district attorney's authority under Article 329
to enter a nolle prosequi without consent of court, and the
granting of complete immunity from prosecution as a multiple
offender. The nolle prosequi, Justice Sanders pointed out, "does
not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. In legal
effect it only discharges the particular indictment. There is a
vast difference between entering a nolle prosequi and granting
full immunity for crime .... This being true, it does not follow
that the district attorney alone has general authority to grant
immunity to an accused for a crime. '28
It is very true that there is a basic distinction, as Justice
Sanders points out, between the district attorney's plenary au-
thority (under Article 329) to nolle prosequi a particular in-
dictment, and the granting of immunity from future habitual
offender charges. However, when the defendant pleads guilty
he is bound by that plea, and he should be entitled to rely on
performance of the district attorney's promise not to enforce
the drastically enhanced penalties which are available under the
habitual offender law. Strong support for the holding that the
state is bound by the district attorney's agreement is found in
the general statement of Article 17 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, relied upon in the majority opinion, that "the district
attorney shall have entire charge and control of every criminal
prosecution instituted or pending in any parish wherein he is
district attorney, and shall determine whom, when, and how he
shall prosecute." Additional support for the district attorney's
authority in regard to the bringing of habitual offender charges
is found in the 1954 amendment of the habitual offender law
which states that the district attorney "may" file a habitual
27. 242 La. 844, 865, 139 So. 2d 205, 212 (1962).
28. Id. at 870, 139 So. 2d at 214.
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offender charge.2 The district attorney will seldom enter into
a plea bargain without the knowledge and approval of the sen-
tencing judge, as was the situation in Hingle. However, if he
should, it would appear that justice and faith in our judicial
procedures will best be served by holding that the state is bound
by the district attorney's agreement as to a matter coming
within his discretion to act.
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS FOR APPEAL BY INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
In Griffin v. Illinois° the United States Supreme Court held
that the denial of a complete stenographic transcript to the
indigent petitioners, for use in taking their appeal, constituted
a violation of the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. Application of the complete tran-
script requirement to Louisiana criminal appeals was squarely
presented in State v. Rideau.31 In Rideau the Louisiana Supreme
Court upheld the trial judge's refusal to have all of the evidence
adduced in the case, including the examination of prospective
jurors, reported and transcribed. Justice Sanders put his finger
on a controlling distinction between Illinois and Louisiana ap-
pellate procedures when he stated:
"In that case (Griffin v. Illinois) it was conceded that the
petitioners needed a full stenographic transcript in order
to get adequate appellate review in the State of Illinois. A
complete bill of exceptions consisted of all proceedings and
evidence. . . . In this state the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in criminal cases extends to questions of law
alone. It cannot review the facts. A stenographic transcript
was made of all bills of exception. The record is adequate
for appellate review of the questions of law. For these rea-
sons the decision of Griffin v. People of State of Illinois,
supra, is not controlling. ' 32
In short, the requested complete transcript of the testimony
was not necessary for appellate consideration of the defendant's
bills of exception in Rideau.
A more difficult problem will be presented in cases where
the defendant's motion for a new trial is based on the ground
29. LA. R.S. 15:529.1D (Supp. 1962).
30. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
31. 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962). Accord, State v. Daley, Case Nos.
46,158-36,160, Nov. 1962.
32. 242 La. 431, 452, 137 So. 2d 283, 291 (1962).
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that "the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence," 83
and the defendant is urging that there is no evidence 34 or "no
evidence of any probative value"3' 5 of an essential element of
the crime. In a recent federal case, United States ex rel. Weston
v. Sigler,"" where a writ of habeas corpus had been applied for,
the circuit court of appeals held, that the failure to furnish a
free transcript of all testimony to an indigent defendant who
was appealing was a denial of "equal protection" of the law.
The ultimate issue appears to be whether a complete transcript
was, in the particular case, required for an adequate presenta-
tion of the defendant's appeal. 7 It may be necessary, in
order to provide for the situation where a defendant is claiming
that there is a complete lack of probative evidence of an essen-
tial element of the crime, to amend and liberalize the provision
of Article 500 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,38 "that any
accused desiring to send up the testimony of all of the witnesses
so taken, shall pay for the same." In such an amendment the






Should a party-witness in a civil case be inexorably bound
by his own disserving testimony? Relying upon Article 2291 of
33. LA. R.S. 15:509(1) (1950).
34. State v. Linkletter, 239 La. 1000, 120 So.2d 835 (1960), Cf. State v.
Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924) where the facts certified by the
trial judge showed that the defendant, convicted of receiving stolen things, really
owned them.
35. State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So. 2d 11 (1958). Accord, Mayerhafer
v. Department of Police, 235 La. 437, 104 So. 2d 163 (1958) using the phrase
"no probative evidence."
36. (Oct. 1962) 5th Circuit Case No. 19402, rehearing pending.
37. State v. Bueche, 243 La. 160, 142 So. 2d 381 (1962) where the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's refusal of a complete transcript, stressing
the fact that there was no allegation that an essential element of the crime was
entirely unsupported by the proof.
38. LA. R.S. 15:500 (1950).
39. The 1960 statute (Act 12), which was suspended in 1960 and repealed in
1962 (Act 449), had provided for a free transcript for all defendants.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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